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IN THE SUPRE,ME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TEDDY B. COVINGTON, by his 
guardian ad litem, Mrs. J. B. Covington, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
~IONT C. CARPENTER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8386 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE~lE~~T OF FACTS 
In this action the plaintiff seeks to recover damages 
from the defendant for injuries sustained by plaintiff 
in a motorcycle-automobile accident that occurred Octo-
ber 3, 1953, at 11:25 A .. M. in front of the Salt Lake Clean-
ing and D;'eing Company on 9th South Street between 
2nd and 3rd East Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah, (R. 
1-2, 24, 25). At the time of the accident plaintiff was 19 
years of age, (R. 37). He had, however, married on 
,January 4, 1955, (H. 44), and thereby attained his 
majority. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Ninth South Street at this point proceeds in a gen-
eral easterly and westerly direction and is straight and 
practically level, (R. 46). The weather was clear, the 
street was dry, and visibility was good, (R. 29, 30, 53). 
There was a cut-back parking area 19 feet in depth in 
front of the Salt Lake Cleaning and Dyeing Company 
located on the north side of 9th South Street, (R. 30). 
There was an 8 foot parking lane on the north side of 
9th South Street, two 10 foot westbound traffic lanes, 
and a series of 4 center lines in the middle of the street 
occupying a space of approximately 4 feet. There were 
also two eastbound traffic lanes each 10 feet in width, 
and an 8 foot parking lane south of the center line of 
said street, (R. 25, 35, 36). 
The plaintiff had operated his Inotorcycle north on 
5th East to 9th South Street where he made a left turn 
into the inside lane for westbound traffic and was pro-
ceeding west along said 9th South Street about in the 
1niddle of the said inside lane for westbound traffic at a 
speed of approximately 25 miles per hour when he 
reached 3rd East Street, (R. 37, 48). 
The defendant's vehicle had been parked on the 
north side of 9th South Street in the cut-back parking 
area in front of the Salt Lake Cleaning and Dyeing 
Company. The defendant was in the act of backing his 
auto from said cut-back parking area immediately prior 
to the time that the accident occurred, (R. 37, 38). The 
west crosswalk at the intersection of 3rd East and 9th 
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South Street was located right close to the west curb 
line of 3rd East, (R. 46, 47). It was undisputed that the 
impact occurred 137 feet west of the extended west curb 
line of 3rd East Street and 3 feet into the inside lane for 
westbound traffic or 7 feet north of the north-most of 
the series of 4 lines forming the center of 9th South 
Street, (R. 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 51, 52). 
The plaintiff testified that when his motorcycle was 
about in the middle of the west crosswalk close to the 
west curb line of 3rd East Street, he observed the de-
fendant's automobile in the act of backing out in a south-
easterly djrection from the recessed area in front of the 
Salt Lake Cleaning and Dyeing Company, (R. 38, 40, 47). 
At that time he was traveling approximately in the 
middle of the inside lane for westbound traffic, (R. 47-
48). He could definitely see that the car was backing 
out onto 9th South, (R. 48), but was not clear whether the 
rear was into the parking lane or whether it may have 
projected somewhat into the outside traffic lane, (R. 49). 
At this time there was no other westbound traffic on 
the street between his motorcycle which was then up in 
the west crosswalk and the defendant's backing automo-
bile. As a matter of fact, the closest westbound traffic 
was down near 2nd East Street. There was no eastbound 
traffic on the street at the time. The plaintiff in this 
connection testified : 
"Q. So you didn't have any traffic in front of you 
that you had to be concerned with, did ~'on? 
A. That is correct. 
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Q. Either going the same direction you were 
going or coming towards you~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. There was nothing that had to concern or in-
volve you there at all~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. The only thing that could possibly enter into 
your path or cause yott any concern when yon 
were up by the west cross walk of 3rd East 
Street was this automobile that was backing 
out into the street, isn't that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And yet you took your eyes from that auto-
mobile for awhile, didn't you? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And looked to the rear? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And is that the only place that you ever 
looked, is to the rear~ 
A. As I recall, yes." (R. 49-50) (Italics ours) 
The plaintiff admitted that he did not intend to 
change lanes, but 1nerely looked to the rear to see what 
traffic there \vas (R. 50). As a matter of fact, he ad-
mitted that there was no traffic close enough to the rear 
of his motorcycle to actually cause him any concern, (R. 
53). 
After taking his eyes from the only car which could 
cause him any concern, he admittedly traveled forward 
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a distance of 120-125 feet at a speed of approximately 
25 miles per hour, all of the time \vhile continuously look-
ing to the rear, (R. 50-51). 'Vhen he again looked to the 
front, he observed the defendant's automobile not more 
than 10-15 feet a·way. Its rear end at that tune was just 
barely emerging into the inside traffic lane, (R. 51). He 
attempted to turn to the left, but in the short space did 
not have time to completely miss the car, but did succeed 
in turning the motorcycle away from the car so that no 
part of his motorcycle came in contact with the vehicle, 
(R. 39, 44, 45, 52). However, his right leg struck the 
extreme left rear corner of the automobile about where 
the left rear tail light was located, (R. 45). At the time 
of the accident he admitted that the automobile only 
projected three feet into the jnside traffic lane and that 
he still had seven feet in the inside traffic lane before 
even reaching the north-most of the four center lines in 
\vhich he could have traveled to avoid the accident had he 
seen the car earlier, (R. 51-52). During all of the time 
he was traveling forward and looking backward, he did 
not reduce his speed at all, (R. 52). l-Ie admitted that the 
left rear of the automobile was the portion thereof which 
projected the farthest out into the street, (R. ~2). 
Following the accident, he was l~'ing on tho south 
side of 9th South Street at a point 75 feet west of the 
point of impact. His motorcycle came to rest on the 
south side of 9th South Street 115 feet from the point of 
impact, (R. 25, 52-;)3). 
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The court questioned the plaintiff concerning the 
n1anner in which the defendant's automobile was being 
-backed out into the street. The plaintiff admitted that 
it was being backed in an angular direction; that its 
speed was moderate, and that there was nothing unusual 
about its operation: 
"THE COURT: And in what manner was the 
defendant's car being backed out into the 
road~ 
A. It was in well, an angular direction. 
THE COURT: And do you have any idea how 
fast it was being backed~ 
A. No. I have no idea. All I know it was a 
moderate back. 
THE COURT: Nothing unusual about it? 
A. Well, not that I could recollect. Except that 
it just seemed like it was out there and that 
was it." (R. 54) (Italics ours) 
According to Officer V algardson, the defendant said 
he hadn't observed any danger, (R. 27), and the defend-
ant further claimed that he had ceased his backward 
movement and was starting forward when the accident 
occurred, (R. 30). The plaintiff contended that the de-
fendant's vehicle was still in its backing process at the 
tirne of the accident, (R. 53). 
The defendant introduced certain photos as exhibits 
showing the recessed parking area and the street adja-
cent thereto, (Exhibits 11, 12 and 13). In addition, the 
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defendant offered in evidence certain photos showing 
the damage to the defendant's vehicle in the accident, 
(Exhibits 10, 14 and 15 ). 
The diagram incorporated in the back of the appel-
lant's brief was not an exhibit in the case. It admittedly 
was not drawn to scale as the 137 feet from the point of 
impact to the west curb line of 3rd East Street is shown 
as being much shorter than the 113 feet from the point 
of impact to the point where the motorcycle came to rest. 
Obviously, the point of impact is located considerably 
further from the west curb line than would be indicated 
in the diagram. The measurements shown thereon, how-
ever, were those testified to by the officer and were all 
made either by steel tape or by a measuremeter, (R. 36). 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case the defendant 
moved for a directed verdict on the ground and for the 
reason that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that any negligence on the 
part of the defendant proximately caused the accident 
and that the plaintiff's own evidence as a matter of law 
showed that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence which proximately contributed to the accident, (R. 
54, 55). The lower court granted the defendant's rnotion, 
(R. 55-57), and it is from the judgment of the court on the 
directed verdict that the plaintiff takes the appeal, (R. 
()2). The only question is whether the court erred in 
granting the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOR ERR IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE PLAIN-
TIFF AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S TES'TI-
MONY. 
(a) THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BY A PRE-
PONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE 
WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S INJURIES. 
(b) THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY AND AS A 
MATTER OF LAW DISCLOSED THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAIN-
TIFF'S ACCIDENT AND INJURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOR ERR IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE PLAIN-
TIFF AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S TESTI-
MONY. 
(a) THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BY A PRE-
PONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE. 
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE 
WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S INJURIES. 
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The burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was 
negligent and that his negligence proximately caused the 
accident. The plaintiff's proof indicated that the defend-
ant was in the act of backing his car out into the street 
and the rear end thereof had ernerged into the parking 
lane or the outside traffic lane when the plaintiff's motor-
c-ycle was up near the west curb line of 3rd East Street 
or approximately 137 feet away. The evidence also in-
dicated that the defendant's vehicle was being operated 
at a "moderate" speed. There was nothing unusual about 
it which the plaintiff could recollect. The vehicle was 
being backed out into the street in an "angular direction" 
to the southeast. Officer Y algardson's testilnony would 
indicate that the vehicle was backing out into the street 
at a speed of 2-3 miles per hour, (R. 31). The evidence 
is undisputed that at the time of the accident the left rear 
corner of the defendant'~ automobile projected the far-
thest out into the street and it was only 3 feet into the 
inside westhound traffic lane at the time of the accident, 
leaving 7 feet in that lane to the north-most of the 4 cen-
ter lines in which the plaintiff could have traveled. The 
evidence is also undisputed that the plaintiff's motorcycle 
did not contact the automobile at all, the impact being on 
the plaintiff's right leg against the extreme left rear 
corner of the defendant's automobile. Officer Valgardson 
testified that following the accident the defendant in-
formed him that he did not observe the danger until the 
moment of the impact. 
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The above and foregoing is all of the evidence in the 
case offered by the plaintiff to show negligence on the 
part of the defendant and to prove that such negligence 
was the proximate cause of the accident. Certainly, the 
testimony did not indicate any negligence in the manner 
or speed at which the vehicle was being operated. The 
only negligence claimed by the plaintiff in his brief is 
that the defendant did not yield the right of way to the 
plaintiff and that the defendant failed to keep a proper 
lookout. Elsewhere in the plaintiff's brief there are in-
tinlations that the defendant was negligent in backing 
so that the rear of his vehicle projected in any manner 
into the inside traffic lane. 
With reference to the alleged failure to yield the 
right of way, plaintiff quotes Section 41-6-100 and Sec-
tion 41-6-106, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Section 41-6-
100 has no application whatsoever to the facts in this 
case. The defendant was not emerging from an alley, 
driveway, or building. Furthermore, his vehicle had been 
parked in the recessed parking area which was only 19 
feet deep. Before the defendant started the vehicle back-
ward, he would already have been in a stopped position. 
Section 41-6-106 does not prohibit a vehicle from 
backing out into the street, but merely requires that 
it shall not proceed backward unless such movement can 
be made with reasonable safety and without interfering 
with other traffic. The plaintiff's motorcycle was ad-
mittedly about 137 feet away when the defendant's vehicle 
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was already in the process of its backward motion and 
when the rear end of the defendant's automobile may 
already have extended out into the outside traffic lane. 
\Vhen the defendant actually started his backward mo-
tion, the motorcycle would have been even further away. 
Considering the admitted low speed of the defendant's 
auto and the 25 miles per hour at which the plaintiff 
was traveling, the motorcycle would have to be at least 
150 feet or a quarter of a block or more away when the 
defendant started to back out from his parked position. 
Under such circumstances it was reasonably safe under 
the statute for the defendant to back out. It was then 
the plaintiff's duty to yield the right of way to the de-
fendant. Furthermore, the defendant's backing did not 
interfere with other traffic. The plaintiff still had 7 
feet in his own lane of traffic to the northmost of the 
four center lines and as a matter of fact all of the rest 
of the street in which to travel. His progress was not 
interfered with even on his own side of the road. 
See 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practice, Permanent Edition, 1955 Cumulative Pocket 
Part, page 45, Sec. 1101, wherein it is said: 
''A motorist backing onto a highway, if in 
the exercise of due care, has the right to assume 
that an approaching motorist will exerci~e due 
care, and the conduct of the backing driver should 
be measured in view of such assumption." 
With referPne<> to the intimation of negligence on 
the defendant'~ part in backing so that the left rear 
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corner of his car projected 3 feet into the inside lane, 
it must be borne in mind that an autonwbile is approxi-
mately 20 feet in length. rrhe distance frOln the curb 
line out to the farthest point at which the defendant'~ 
vehicle projected into the street was only 21 feet. Even 
though the defendant's vehicle was backing in a south-
easterly direction, considering the width of the street 
and the length of the car, it would require the vehicle to 
proceed out into the street and son1ewhat into the inside 
traffic lane in order to proceed westward along the 
street. Any reasonably individual would anticipate such 
action. Accordingly, there can be no negligence on the 
part of the defendant in this regard. 
Even if we are to concede that the defendant was 
negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout or that he 
was negligent in either of the other particulars, nonethe-
less the plaintiff \vholly failed to prove that such negli-
gence on the part of the defendant proximately caused 
the accident. If the defendant had seen the plaintiff's 
1notorcycle when he started to back out into the street, 
the motorcycle would have been somewhere in the in-
tersection approxinmtely 150 feet or a quarter of a block 
or more away. This must follow because when the de-
fendant's vehicle was actually in the backing process 
with its rear extending perhaps into the outside west-
bound traffic lane, the plaintiff's motorcycle was then 
admittedly 137 feet away. If in fact the defendant had 
seen the plaintiff's motorcycle when he started to back, 
the defendant under such circumstances would have the 
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right to proceed with his backward motion. If he had 
seen the plaintiff's motorcycle at the time the plaintiff 
first saw the defendant's vehicle, the defendant would 
still have the right to continue in his backward process 
and to assume that the plaintiff would slow down or turn 
out without proceeding directly into him. The defendant 
had not blocked the plaintiff's path. There was still 
7 feet in the inside lane for westbound traffic to the 
northmost of the 4 center lines in which the plaintiff 
could have traveled. We, therefore, cannot see how any 
negligence on the part of the defendant in the matter 
of lookout or otherwise could have been a proximate 
cause of the accident. The proximate cause of the acci-
dent was the plaintiff's failure to slow down, turn out, 
or otherwise act to avoid the accident with opportunity 
so to do. 
(b) THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY AND AS A 
MATTER OF LAW DISCLOSED THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE WHI·CH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAIN-
TIFF'S ACCIDENT AND INJURY. 
When the plaintiff was 120-125 feet away, or about 
in the middle of the west crosswalk, he actually observed 
the defendant's vehicle in the process of backing out 
into the street from the 19 foot recessed parking area. 
The rear of the defendant's vehicle at that time was 
emerging ejther into the parking lane or perhaps into 
th~ outside \\'estbound traffic lane. Plaintiff attempts 
to make much of the statement that the vehicle was 
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backing at an angle to go out into the first lane of traffic. 
Actually, the plaintiff did not know into what lane of 
traffic the vehicle was going. He knew that it was back-
ing at an angle in a southeasterly direction, and, what 
is more important, he knew when he first saw it that 
it was the only vehicle on the street which could possibly 
enter his path or cause him any concern. This was what 
the court had in mind when he said that the plaintiff 
was aware of a vehicle approaching into his path. The 
uncontradicted testimony was that there were no other 
vehicles on the street to cause the plaintiff any concern 
other than the defendant's backing automobile. The plain-
tiff admitted this car might enter his path and cause him 
some concern. Actually, when the plaintiff first saw the 
defendant's vehicle, all he saw was that it was backing out 
into the street and might possibly enter his path and 
cause him some concern. Nonetheless, he took his eyes 
from the one and only point at which he stated there was 
any danger, and looked to the rear. Furthermore, he 
continued to look to the rear for 120-125 feet, all the 
tin1e while proceeding forward into the one known source 
of possible danger. Plaintiff claims that by reason of 
the speed at which the plaintiff was traveling he would 
cover the distance of 120-125 feet in approximately 3 
seconds. This in our opinion makes the plaintiff's con-
duct even more negligent. To continue to travel for-
ward at a speed of 25 miles per hour into the face of a 
possible known danger while continuously looking back-
ward is, in our opinion, not only negligent but foolhardy. 
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Furthermore, there was nothing which required the 
plaintiff's attention to the rear for a period of 3 seconds 
or more. He admitted he was not going to change traffic 
lanes and, as a matter of fact, admitted there were 
no vehicles close enough to his rear to cause him any 
concern. Notwithstanding this, he continued to look to 
the rear when he knew the only possible source of dan-
ger was in the front. 
Plaintiff claims that when he saw the defendant's 
vehicle the second time he was too close to it and then 
was confronted with a sudden e1nergency and did all 
that was possible to extricate himself therefrom. The 
plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the sudden 
emergency doctrine. An emergency must be one that has 
not been created by the plaintiff. In this case if the plain-
tiff did find himself in a position from which he could not 
extricate himself, it was solely due to his negligence in 
continually looking backward while proceeding forward 
into his one known possible danger. The sudden emer-
gency doctrine does not apply to the plaintiff under the 
evidence in this case. See Blashfield Cyclopedia of Auto-
mobile Law & Practice, Volume 1, Part 2, Page 547, Sec. 
669: 
"The rule of sudden emergency * * * cannot 
be invoked by one who has brought that emer-
gency upon himself by his own wrong or who has 
not used due care to avoid it." 
See also Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah (2d) 392, 
wherein the Utah Supreme Court said: 
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"* * * vVhere the plaintiff creates the peril 
by his own fault, he may not thereafter urge the 
sudden emergency doctrine to protect himself 
from a charge of contributory negligence." 
Plaintiff contends in his brief that when he first 
saw the defendant's vehicle he had the right to assume 
that the defendant would not interfere with his approach-
ing motorcycle and thereby infers that he could become 
completely oblivious to what the defendant did. Plaintiff 
also takes the position that he had the right to assume 
that the defendant would back out into the outside traf-
fic lane and by reason thereof was not required to look 
forward again. Such arguments can have no weight, 
particularly in view of the plaintiff's admission that he 
kne\v when he first saw the defendant's backing auto-
mobile that it was the only vehicle on the street which 
could possibly cross his path or cause him any concern. 
With such knowledge, the plaintiff had no right to con-
tinuously look to the rear. 
Plaintiff cites frmn Blashfield Cyclopedia of Auto-
n1obile Law and Practice, Volume 2, Par. 1105, page 426, 
to the effect that an approaching motorist on a highway 
is entitled to assume that the latter will operate his 
autmnobile with due care and caution and leave a space 
open for his passage. The rights as between the backing 
driver and the approaching motorist are relative as is 
clearly indicated by the citation from 2 Blashfield 
C~rclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, 1955 
Cumulative Pocket Part, page 45, Sec. 1101, supra, page 
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11, wherein the converse of the rule as stated by the plain-
tiff is set forth. There it is indicated that the backing 
motorist has the right to assume that the approaching 
motorist will exercise due care. Regardless of any negli-
gence on the part of the defendant, the conduct on the 
part of the plaintiff in proceeding forward without re-
ducing his speed and while continuously looking to the 
rear is contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
particularly with plaintiff's knowledge of the fact that 
the vehicle was backing out into the street when he was 
120-123 feet away, and with his admission that the back-
ing vehicle was the only one which could possibly cause 
him any concern. 
Conceding for the purpose of argument that the 
plaintiff had the right of way over the defendant's back-
ing automobile, this would not justify the plaintiff in 
failing to keep a proper or reasonable lookout for the 
only vehicle which admittedly could cross his path or 
cause him any concern. See Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 
98 Pac. (2d) 350. In that case a motorcyclist approach-
ing an intersection at a speed of :25 miles per hour failed 
to observe a truck on his left until he was within 20 feet 
of the intersection, notwithstanding the fact that his view 
was obstructed for a distance of 200 to 800 feet. This 
Court held the motorcyclist to be guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law in failing to observe the 
truck sooner and for insisting upon his right of way. 
The court said : 
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"The circumstances may be such, that by his 
own conduct, he who has the apparent right of 
way has lost the benefit of that right; or the cir-
cumstances may be such that for him to insist 
that this position on the right entitled him to 
proceed first through the intersection would be 
carelessness and negligence upon his part. * * * " 
In Hickok r. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 Pac. (2d) 514, 
this Court held a plaintiff guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law for failure to keep a proper 
lookout, saying: 
"Granted that the defendant should have 
yielded the right of way, that does not absolve 
plaintiff of negligence for his prolonged inatten-
tion to the traffic that was approaching west on 
21st South. He testified that, having once seen 
defendant's autmnobile approaching the intersec-
tion 400 to 500 feet to the east, he started his car 
forward from a point 20 feet back frmn the in-
tersection, drove into and almost across the in-
tersection or a distance of 65 feet, without ever 
again looking in the direction from which defen-
dant's car was approaching. For a period of ap-
proximately six to Beven and one-half seconds, 
the plaintiff never looked to the east on 21st 
South Street, from which direction he knew there 
was a car coming. ***** The fact that the plain-
tiff had the right of way over the defendant did 
not permit him, after having observed the defen-
dant's car approaching the intersection, to there-
after completely ignore it, even though at the time 
he started he 1night reasonabl:v have believed he 
had time in which to get safely across. ***** The 
time element, ez-en if it 1cere less than is shmrn 
by the evidence, 1ras such that a reasonably pru-
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dent and careful person would have glanced to 
the east several times while traversing the dist-
ance from the stop sign to the point of collision." 
(Italics ours) 
In ~iingtts v. Olsson, 11-l: Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d) 
4:95, this Court held a pedestrian to be guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to 
keep a proper lookout, notwithstanding the fact that he 
was in the crosswalk and had the right of way over the 
defendant's vehicle, saying: 
"A pedestrian crossing a public street in a 
crosswalk or pedestrian lane, although he may 
have the right of way over vehicular traffic, none-
theless has the duty to observe for such traffic. 
Clearly, decedent neglected that duty in this case. 
It follows that he was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law. Of course we do not mean to 
imply that a mere glance in the direction of the 
approaching automobile would suffice. The duty 
to look has inherent in it the duty to see what is 
there to be seen, and to pay heed to it." 
In Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 Pac. (2d) 
437, a motorist who was proceeding on an arterial high-
way was held guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout for a vehicle 
approaching from the nonfavored highway. The Court 
said: 
"Defendant's truck driver, knowing there was 
a car approaching from the north, never again 
looked in that direction until it was too late to 
avoid a collision. By his own admission the truck 
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driver travelled at least one quarter of a block 
without 1naking any further observation of a car 
which, at the time he first saw it, was much 
nearer the intersection than was his. lie asserts 
his attention was focused on traffir that might 
be coming fron1 the south. If, as he claims, he 
was unable to get a clear view to the south on 
lOth East Street, there was nothing to prevent 
him from reducing the speed of his truck so as 
to permit a reasonable opportunity to observe 
the approach of cars from other directions. In 
this case we have the driver of a truck travelling 
between 30 and 45 mph who knows a car is ap-
proaching from his left, keeping his eyes on 
what he claims to be a blind corner on his right, 
and ignoring the approach of the vehicle from 
his left, because of the assumption that as to the 
latter car he has the right of way. *:K-**** He 
thereafter completely ignored the Conklin car 
and drove blindly ahead without again checking 
the position and movement of the other car until 
too late to avoid colliding with it. The defendant 
truck driver was not justified in thus ignoring 
the 1novement of plaintiff's automobile. The duty 
to keep a proper lookout applies as well to the 
favored as to the disfavored driver. Neither 
driver can excuse his own failure to observe be-
cause the other driver failed in his duty. Neither 
driver is at any time to be excused for want of 
vigilance or failure to see what is plain to be 
seen. Drivers are pennitted to cross over arterial 
highways after having stopped. True, they must 
yield the right of way to cars which are close 
enough to constitute an immediate hazard. This 
rule, however, requires the exercise of some judg-
ment. There is still a duty on the part of the driver 
travelling the arterial highway to remain reason-
ably alert to the possibility of the disfavored 
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driver starting across the intersection in the be-
lief that he can cross in safety. The d~tty of keep-
ing a proper lookout attends all those operating 
motor vehicles, and other rules of the road do 
not relieve any driver of the necessity of comply-
ing 1cith this req~tirement." (Italics ours) 
The plaintiff in his brief relies upon the case of 
~llartin v. Stevens, ________ Utah ________ , 243 Pac. (2d) 747. 
The facts in that case bear no similarity to the 
facts in the case at bar. In the Stevens case both vehicles 
were approaching a blind intersection. In speakig of the 
plaintiff's conduct, the court said: 
"We must remember that there were three 
other streets to give some attention to as he ap-
proached the intersection. All of the attention 
could not very well or safely be focused on any 
one at any given instant. Remaining aware of the 
others and giving them secondary attention, the 
plaintiff would look to the west, as he said he 
did, to observe for the favored traffic to which 
he must give right of way, if any was near. He 
then looked to the east and saw no car within 
the extent of his vision, 150 to 200 feet. At that 
instant he was entitled to assume, absent any-
thing to warn him to the contrary, that any car 
approaching from that direction would do so at a 
lawful rate of speed, that is, not to exceed about 
25 miles per hour. He then changed his main 
attention back to the intersection and the south 
and west and proceeded." (Italics ours) 
In that case in analyzing the cases of Hickok v. 
Skinner, Conklin v. Walsh, and Bullock v. Luke, supra, 
the Utah Supreme Court said: 
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"**** the circumstances were such that the 
driver held to be negligent as a matter of law, 
either observed, or in the exercise of due care 
should have observed, the manner in which the 
other driver was approaching the intersection and 
clearly could by ordinary reasonable care have 
avoided the collision." 
'l'he facts in the case at bar come within the doctrine 
announced in Hickok v. Skinner, Conklin v. Walsh and 
Bullock 1:. Luke, and not under the facts in the Martin 
v. Stevens case. In the case at bar the plaintiff actually 
saw the defendant's vehicle in the process of backing 
out into the street when he was 120-125 feet away. He 
actually knew that it was the only vehicle which could 
possibly cross his path or cause him any concern. There 
were no other vehicles either eastbound or westbound 
on the highway in front of him and no vehicles in close 
proximity to his rear. He was not going to change lanes 
of traffic and there were no intersecting streets. His 
attention should have been directed to the one source 
which admittedly could cause him concern. His failure 
to continue to make further observations or to slow down 
while traveling forward a distance of 120-125 feet con-
stitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
Certainly had the plaintiff been keeping a proper look-
out, he could have avoided the accident in its entirety. 
A change of 2 or 3 feet at most in his course would 
have completely avoided the accident. He had seven feet 
on his own side of the road before even reaching the 
north-most of the four renter lines of the highway within 
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which to make this turn, and, as a matter of fact, he 
had all of the south half of the road since there were no 
approaching eastbound vehicles. 
A case involving somewhat similar, although dis-
tinguishing facts, is Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390, 
216 Pac. (2d) 640. In that case a motorcyclist sought 
to recover damages as a result of a collision with a truck. 
The motorcyclist \\·as proceeding along the highway and 
first observed the truck at a distance of about 200 feet. 
It \Vas parked off the paved portion of the highway in 
front of a dwelling. The motorcyclist did not thereafter 
observe the truck until it was about 30 feet away and 
on the high\vay in front of him, and he was then unable 
to avoid the accident. In that case it was contended that 
the motorcyclist was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law and that the court erred in failing to 
grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The 
Court stated that the facts involved "a close case" and 
one which "must stand strictly on its own facts." In 
holding that the defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict was properly refused, the Court said: 
"Nate that this is not the case of a vehicle 
parked off the pavement under such circumstances 
as would give warning that the driver had moved 
off the pavement onto the shoulder of th•e road 
only momentarily and might at any moment move 
back onto it as frequently happens with the travel-
ing public. ***** Had the plaintiff when he ob-
served the truck standing on the shoulder of the 
highway, known or had reason to believe that the 
tntck was about ready to enter upon the pave-
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ment, there might be merit in the defendant's as-
signment of error. But according to the plaintiff's 
testimony, when he first observed the truck it 
was standing motionless in front of a dwelling 
and there was no indication whatever that it was 
about to be moved onto the pavement. The plain-
tiff was not alerted to any iJnmedinte danger. 
Under these circumstances we are convinced that 
the issue of whether the plaintiff was negligent 
in failing to keep a more diligent lookout ahead 
was properly submitted to the jury." 
The Court further said: 
"It can be seen from the above that any slight 
change in the situation might change the ques-
tion from one for the jury to one for the court 
as a matter of law." (Italics ours) 
The Court distinguishes the Spaclnnan case from 
Conklin v. Walsh on the ground that in the Spackman 
case the plaintiff was not alerted to the danger, where-
as in the Conklin case he was. Here again we submit 
that the one factor which this Court indicated was absent 
in the Spackman case was in fact present in the case at 
bar, to-wit: the plaintiff in the case at bar \vas clearly 
alerted to the danger. He actually saw the vehicle when 
120-125 feet away and admitted that it was the only 
vehicle which could possibly cross his path or cause him 
any concern. Nonetheless, he chose to cmnpletely di~­
regard its presence. 
As we review the rtah divisions where a motorist is 
alerted to a possible danger he is not thereafter justified 
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in failing to keep a proper lookout at the source or di-
rection of that danger, and if he fails to do so, he is 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
This is exactly what the plaintiff did in the case at bar, 
and under the Utah authorities it must necessarily follow 
that he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law in failing to keep a proper lookout. 
See also Jlurphy v. Watson) (Pa.) 197 A. 151, where-
in it is said: 
"After carefully reading the testimony, we 
are in agreement with the court below that ap-
pellant was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. She was injured in a private area-
way in use by cars, and although she knew that 
an automobile was being operated in dangerous 
proximity to her) she did not look out for its 
approach." (Italics ours). 
In considering the lookout maintained by the plain-
tiff, it should be borne in mind that there were no cir-
cumstances present in the case at bar which would justify 
the plaintiff in looking anywhere other than straight 
ahead. rrhe :\Iinnesota court in the case of Dreyer v. 
Otter Tail PoU'cr Co.) 285 N.W. 707, has had occasion to 
comment on distracting circumstances which would 
justify one in diverting his attention elsewhere. The 
Court in that case said: 
"The argument for plaintiff misconceives 
what is meant in the law of negligence by the 
phrase 'distracting circumstances.' No court has 
attempted to give an exclusive definition, and we 
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make no such atte~npt. But it is clear that therl! 
must be not only another danger from which at-
tention may be diverted, but also that the circum-
stances relied upon as distracting must be such 
as of the~nselves 1nay reasonably be considered to 
portend danger. City of Radford v. Calhoun, 165 
V a. 24, 181 S.E. 345, 100 A.L.R. 1378; Car borne 
v. Boston & Me. R. 89 N.H. 12, 192 A. 858, 3 
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practice, Perm. Ed., Sec. 1748." 
In the case of Hickok v. Skinner, supra, the Utah 
Supreme Court indicated that the evidence in that case 
failed to establish any traffic situation which would 
justify the plaintiff in failing to make a further re-ap-
praisal of the situation as he proceeded forward. 
See also Smith v. Bennett, ____ Utah 2d ____ , 265 Pac. 
(2d) 401, wherein the Utah Supreme Court has again con-
sidered the question of lookout and distracting circum-
stances. The lower court had directed a verdict in favor 
of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff, a 
pedestrian, was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout. In 
affirming the judgment this court distinguished the 
Smith case frmn the case of JJf art in v. Stevens and other 
like cases, saying: 
"A major dissimilarity exists between the 
facts of the case now before the court and plain-
tiff's authorities. In these cases we were con-
cerned with situations such as intersectional ac-
cidents where the plaintiff's attention was de-
manded in more than one direction or in more 
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than one place. Since his attention could not be in 
all places and in all directions at once, it was a 
question of human judgment as to how his atten-
tion should be distributed mnong the several com-
peting demands. A question of fact for the jury 
was presented as to whether his distribution of 
attention was reasonable. In the instant case there 
was but one demand rztpon plaintiff's attention. 
There is no room for a reasonable difference of 
opinion as to where her attention should have 
been concentrated; it was inctunbent upon her to 
observe the condition of approaching traffic. That 
she failed to use due care in doing so is manifest 
frmn the evidence." (Italics ours). 
In the case at bar there was but one demand upon 
the plaintiff's attention, namely, the defendant's auto, 
which according to the plaintiff was the only auto which 
could possibly cross his path or cause him concern. There 
is therefore no room for a reasonable difference of 
opinion as to the place where the plaintiff's attention 
should have been concentrated. 
See also Parrack v. McGaffey, (Iowa) 251 N.W. 871, 
wherein the Iowa court said: 
"It is the settled rule of law, where one volun-
tarily places himself in a position of danger which 
can be seen and appreciated, he is guilty of con-
tributory negligence, as a matter of law." 
In this case the plaintiff not only appreciated the 
possible danger, but continued headlong towards it while 
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continuously looking to the rear. Under such circum-
stances he was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
n1atter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence in the case that the defendant was negligent, 
or, if negligent, that such negligence was the proximate 
cause of the accident. Furthermore, the plaintiff's evi-
dence conclusively and as a 1natter of law showed that 
the plaintiff \vas guilty of contributory negligence. The 
lower court, therefore, properly granted the defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict. The judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent, 
604-610 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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